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Philosophy of Religion 1

B023
Session Chair: N.N. | Monday, August 24, 3:30-5:30 p.m. | Venue

Naomi Miyazaki

Die politische Philosophie über das Vergängliche in der Gegenwart. Zu den Begriffen „Erwartung“ Paul Tillichs und „Ungleichzeitigkeit“ Ernst Blochs

Tillich und Bloch haben an vergleichbaren strukturellen Problemstellungen während der Weimarer Republik gearbeitet. Tillich hat in „Sozialistische Entscheidung“ von 1933 sowohl an der politischen Romantik als auch am damaligen Sozialismus Kritik geübt, weil besonders die politische Romantik keine „intentionale Auf-Zu-Struktur“ hat. Wie Tillich kritisiert Bloch in „Erbschaft dieser Zeit“ von 1935 gleichzeitig den Faschismus und den sogenannten „orthodoxen“ Marxismus, der keine gültige Kritik am Faschismus entfalten kann. Bei der zeitgenössischen Diagnose hat Bloch die noch in der Gegenwart wirkende „Ungleichzeitigkeit“ als ein Moment der Veränderung der Gesellschaft thematisiert. In meiner Präsentation werden fundamentale Begriffe für die politische Philosophie wie „Erwartung“ bei Tillich und „Ungleichzeitigkeit“ bei Bloch auf der Basis der Religionsphilosophie Tillichs und der Ontologie Blochs erörtert und die Struktur dieser Begriffe wird verglichen.

Christian Kästner

A Wittgensteinian Interpretation of Bodin's 1588 "Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime"

This paper brings Bodin's text, written around 1588, and Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief into conversation with each other to elucidate a possible approach to interreligious dialogue. The Colloquium narrates the discussions of seven people, each representing a different religion, on the truth of their religious beliefs. In the literature, the Colloquium is usually treated as an example of a pluralist approach to religions, i.e. the view that various religions afford access to absolute truth; that each contains some falsity; and that they potentially complement each other. Epistemologically such a view is problematic and consequently there is much disagreement in the literature about the success of the Colloquium's dialogue. This paper suggests that there is a different way to read this dialogue. Employing Wittgenstein's notion of "language game" and his distinction between "saying" and "showing," I argue that the dialogue of the Colloquium does not aim at pluralist consent and that, if at all, it "shows" complementarity rather than "saying" it. As such, it can serve as a model for successful, i.e. epistemologically sound, interfaith dialogue.

Curtis Hutt

The World as He Found It: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Philosophy of Religion

What are the implications of Wittgenstein’s so-called "quietism" on his philosophy of religion? Some commentators have linked, unjustifiably in my view, Wittgenstein's assertion in the Investigations that at its best philosophy "leaves everything as it is" (§124) with his plea for silence regarding what cannot be said found in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Divergence over the interpretation of Wittgenstein on "quietism" and especially the say/show distinction will be understood as the pivot upon which possible “Wittgensteinian” accounts of religion hinge. I argue that Wittgenstein's advocacy of "quietism" in the Investigations, while bearing a superficial resemblance to his pleas for "silence" regarding what cannot be said in the Tractatus, is very dissimilar. According to Wittgenstein's new theory of meaning, all appeal to what cannot be accounted for through examination of linguistic usage in specific discursive contexts is disallowed. The quietism characterizing Wittgenstein's later philosophy leaves the unsayable “nonsense” of the Tractatus behind.

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